

Studies in German Idealism

Volume 12

Moses Mendelssohn

Daniel O. Dahlstrom

Corey Dyck

Translators

Morning Hours

Lectures on
God's Existence



Springer

Studies in German Idealism

Volume 12

Moses Mendelssohn

Daniel O. Dahlstrom
Corey Dyck
Translators

Morning Hours

Lectures on
God's Existence



Springer

MORNING HOURS

Studies in German Idealism

Series Editor:

Reinier W. Munk, *VU University, Amsterdam, The Netherlands*

Advisory Editorial Board:

Frederick Beiser, *Syracuse University, U.S.A.*

Daniel Dahlstrom, *Boston University, U.S.A.*

George di Giovanni, *McGill University, Montreal, Canada*

Paul Guyer, *University of Pennsylvania, U.S.A.*

Detlev Pätzold, *University of Groningen, The Netherlands*

Andrea Poma, *University of Torino, Italy*

VOLUME 12

For other titles published in this series, go to www.springer.com/series/6545

MORNING HOURS

LECTURES ON GOD'S EXISTENCE

by

MOSES MENDELSSOHN

Translated by

DANIEL O. DAHLSTROM AND COREY DYCK

 Springer

Moses Mendelssohn (1729-1786)

Daniel O. Dahlstrom
Department of Philosophy
Boston University
Boston, MA
USA
dahlstro@bu.edu

Corey Dyck
Department of Philosophy
University of Western Ontario
London, ON
Canada
cdyck5@uwo.ca

ISSN 1571-4764

ISBN 978-94-007-0417-6

e-ISBN 978-94-007-0418-3

DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-0418-3

Springer Dordrecht Heidelberg London New York

Library of Congress Control Number: 2011920688

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2011

No part of this work may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, microfilming, recording or otherwise, without written permission from the Publisher, with the exception of any material supplied specifically for the purpose of being entered and executed on a computer system, for exclusive use by the purchaser of the work.

Printed on acid-free paper

Springer is part of Springer Science+Business Media (www.springer.com)

To the memory of our fathers

Introduction

Morning Hours is the last work published by Moses Mendelssohn during his lifetime. Published in Berlin in the summer of 1785 as a series of lectures held at dawn, it is also the most sustained presentation of his epistemological and metaphysical views, all elaborated in the service of presenting proofs for the existence of God.¹ But *Morning Hours* is much more than a theoretical treatise in the form of reported lectures and occasional dialogue. The text was written in the thick of the *Pantheismusstreit*, Mendelssohn's "dispute" with F. H. Jacobi over the nature and scope of Lessing's attitude toward Spinoza and "pantheism." As the latest salvo in a war of texts with Jacobi, *Morning Hours* is also Mendelssohn's attempt to set the record straight regarding his beloved Lessing in this connection, not least by demonstrating the absence of any practical difference between theism and a "purified pantheism."²

¹The complete text of *Morgenstunden* and the basis for this translation are to be found in Moses Mendelssohn, *Gesammelte Schriften Jubiläumsausgabe*, Band 3.2, herausgegeben von Leo Strauss (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1929 ff. [from 1974: Stuttgart u. Bad Cannstatt: F. Fromann]), 1–175. All numbers in square brackets in the body of the text refer to this German edition. All numbers in parentheses in the body of this introduction refer to the pagination of our English translation, followed by a slash and the pagination of this German edition. In the notes the respective volumes of the *Jubiläumsausgabe* are cited hereafter as 'JubA', followed by the volume number, a colon, and page numbers.

²Two likely factors in the genesis of *Morning Hours* deserve mention here. First, following Lessing's death, his brother, Karl Gotthelf, corresponded with Mendelssohn, seeking his counsel on matters pertaining to the editing of Lessing's posthumous writings. Both Karl and Mendelssohn deplored the way that Lessing was being treated and viewed at the time. In this context, on April 22, 1783, Karl sent Mendelssohn a copy of Lessing's "Christianity of Reason." Upon reading it, Mendelssohn revived a long-delayed project of writing a book on Lessing's character. The text of *Morning Hours* originates in this project. Thus, Mendelssohn writes Karl Lessing of his resolve to "devote his morning hours" to the planned work in memory of Lessing; see Alexander Altmann, *Moses Mendelssohn: A Biographical Study* (London/Portland, Oregon: Littman Library of Jewish Civilization, 1998), 591. Not coincidentally, Mendelssohn cites "Christianity of Reason" extensively on the concluding pages of Chap. 15, entitled "Lessing – His Contribution to the Religion of Reason – His Thoughts on Purified Pantheism." The second factor contributing to the genesis of *Morning Hours* is Mendelssohn's relation to Johann Reimarus. Friends of Lessing and Mendelssohn, Johann and his sister Elise Reimarus were children of the famous deist, Hermann Samuel Reimarus, whose posthumous writings contained a highly controversial fragment ("Fragment of the Unnamed") that Lessing began to publish in 1774. Altmann suggests that

Mendelssohn introduces *Morning Hours* as the fruit of his attempt to introduce his son early enough to “rational knowledge of God.”³ Ostensibly planned as the first of two volumes (though the second volume never surfaced⁴), the text is divided into two parts. In a January 5, 1784 letter to Elise Reimarus, Mendelssohn notes that the refuter of Spinozism would have to undertake the “Sisyphean labour” of thinking through the basic concepts of “*substance, truth, cause*” – and, above all – “*objective existence*” and how we arrive at them.⁵ Mendelssohn undertakes at least some of these labors in the first part of *Morning Hours*, dubbed “Preliminary Knowledge of Truth, Semblance, and Error.” In the second part “Scientific Doctrinal Concepts of God’s Existence,” Mendelssohn settles his accounts with Spinozism, sketches a “purified pantheism” and defends its innocuousness, on the way to presenting both revisions of his earlier versions of proofs and what he took to be a novel proof for God’s existence.⁶

The chief aim of the following introduction is to present an overview of the themes and arguments of *Morning Hours*. But before turning to that overview, it may be helpful to situate the work in relation to previous such efforts, his own and others. At the outset of the book Mendelssohn takes pains to inform the reader that,

Dr. Johann Reimarus is the figure in Chap. 15, identified as “friend D,” who protests against presenting Lessing as the spokesperson for a refined pantheism, as Mendelssohn does in the preceding chapter. In any case, Mendelssohn sent Dr. Reimarus copies of the first and second parts of the manuscript of *Morgenstunden* separately and Dr. Reimarus replied with comments both in a supplement to a letter of June 18, 1785 (JubA 13: 283–288) and in a letter of July 28, 1785 (JubA 13: 293–296). However, neither of these letters contain the remarks published in the “Remarks and Additions” that conclude the *Morgenstunden*, and it is thought that the comments must have been a part of the supplement to the former letter that was not preserved. See Altmann, *Moses Mendelssohn*, 253f, 330, 622, 691–698, 860f, n. 70 and n. 73.

³In addition to Mendelssohn’s son, Joseph, the other students participating in Mendelssohn’s dawn lectures were Simon Veit Witzhausen [S] (Mendelssohn’s son-in-law) and Bernhard Wessely [W], nephew of the Hebrew poet and linguist Hartwig Wessely.

⁴On May 24, 1785 Mendelssohn writes Elise Reimarus, who served as something of a go-between for him and Jacobi, that he (Mendelssohn) plans a sequel containing “everything pertaining to Jacobi and Lessing” (JubA 13: 282–283); Altmann argues that this talk of a sequel is a piece of gamesmanship not to be taken seriously; see Altmann, *Moses Mendelssohn*, 649, 686.

⁵JubA 13: 168: “Aber der Widerleger hat sisyphische Arbeit. Nun gehe er wieder an die ersten Begriffe, und widerkäue sie ohne Ekel! was [sic.] *Substanz, Wahrheit, Ursache*, hauptsächlich, worauf es meistens anzukommen scheint, was *objectives Daseyn* sei, und wie wir zu diesen Begriffen gelangen.” At this point Mendelssohn is urging the project on Dr. Reimarus, saying that for him [Mendelssohn] it would be “a fatal undertaking [eine tödtende Arbeit]” (ibid.).

⁶In a January 28, 1785 letter to Elise Reimarus, Mendelssohn refers to such a “revision” of the proofs of God’s existence: “Vor der Hand gehet zwar meine Untersuchung nicht den Spinozismus allein an; sondern ist eine Art von Revision der Beweise vom Daseyn Gottes überhaupt” (JubA 13: 263). Other possible factors contributing to Mendelssohn’s revision of these proofs is his apparent dissatisfaction with the style of his earlier discussion of the proofs, and his acknowledgement of the Herzog of Braunschweig’s desire to have these proofs presented in a form similar to that of *Phaedon*; see Mendelssohn’s letter of Oct. 12, 1785 (JubA 13: 311) and Leo Strauss’ introduction to the volume containing *Morgenstunden* (JubA 3.2: xii–xiv).

due to a nervous illness, he has not in fact kept up with more recent developments in philosophy and that *Morning Hours* is accordingly based upon a speculative metaphysics apparently no longer in favor. He is referring to the sort of metaphysics elaborated some 20 years earlier in his *Philosophical Writings* (1761¹, 1771²), the Prize Essay: *On Evidence in Metaphysical Sciences* (1764), and *Phaedo: or On the Immortality of the Soul, in three dialogues* (1767).⁷ In these earlier works, drawing heavily but not uncritically on the writings of Leibniz and Wolf, Mendelssohn defended a wide range of themes: the compatibility of human freedom with divine freedom and the pre-established harmony, the identity of indiscernibles, God's existence, and the simplicity and immortality of the soul. In the Prize Essay, he also argued that mathematics and metaphysics share a common analytical method, despite their differences in content and perspicuity.

Two aspects of the difference between mathematics and metaphysics in the Prize Essay continue to inform Mendelssohn's thinking in the *Morning Hours*. According to the Prize Essay, mathematics is perspicuous because it employs exact signs to investigate quantities. While the quantitative principles discerned by mathematics govern the constancy of appearances, the quantities themselves are merely possibilities and not necessarily actual. By contrast, metaphysics is less evident because it relies upon inexact signs to investigate qualities and their actual existence. Thus, in the Prize Essay, the difference between mathematics and metaphysics turns for Mendelssohn on the difference between appearance and reality and a parallel difference between exact and inexact signs. Even for the idealist, he contends in the Prize Essay, the truths of mathematics obtain as long as there is a difference between the constancy and inconstancy of appearances. By contrast, the metaphysician must establish the existence of objects and not simply a constancy in appearances. Moreover, at least for geometry, the mental signs of geometric objects are more exact than the language – the arbitrary signs – that the metaphysician must use to signify the objects of metaphysics.

In the *Morning Hours* the difference between appearances and reality takes center stage as does the plight of metaphysics, i.e., the inevitable inexactness of its signs (language). Indeed, at times Mendelssohn acknowledges misgivings that basic philosophical disputes are anything more than verbal disputes. Thus, he cites with approval his interlocutor's remark: "I fear that, in the end, the famous quarrel among materialists, idealists, and dualists amounts to a merely verbal dispute, more a matter for the linguist than the speculative philosopher" (/61).⁸ Still, far from succumbing to the temptation to let linguistic ambiguities get the better of reason

⁷ See Moses Mendelssohn, *Philosophical Writings*, tr. and ed. Daniel O. Dahlstrom (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997). This edition also contains a translation of the prize essay. For translations of the *Phaedo* into English, see *Phaedon or The Death of Socrates*, trans. Charles Cullen (Bristol: Thoemmes Continuum, 2004 [a reprint of the 1789 edition]), and *Phädon or On the Immortality of the Soul*, trans. Patricia Noble (New York: Peter Lang, 2007).

⁸ "You know how much I am inclined to explain all disputes among philosophical schools as merely verbal disputes or at least to derive them originally from verbal disputes" (/104).

(the arbiter of speculation and common sense⁹), Mendelssohn mounts a metaphysical argument in *Morning Hours* for maintaining a distinction between appearance and reality, a distinction in keeping with the dualism he endorses. According to Mendelssohn, a dualist holds that there is some original substance independent of the mind to which sensory phenomena or appearances pertain (41/59). By contrast, the idealist (as Mendelssohn understands him in *Morning Hours*) maintains that all phenomena of our senses are merely accidents of the mind and pertain to no material original (as opposed to the materialist who denies the existence of simple spiritual beings).

Part I: Preliminary Knowledge of Truth, Semblance, and Error

In the opening pages of the book, after contesting the fruitfulness of a purely correspondence theory of truth, Mendelssohn opts for considering truth in terms of the soul's capacities to know. Truth is knowledge grounded in a positive power of the soul, while untruth is "*any knowledge that has suffered an alteration through the incapacity, the limitations of our positive power*" (21/34). Taking his cues from the difference between the soul's rational and sensory powers, Mendelssohn accordingly grounds truth in either the thinkability or the actuality of thoughts. Thinkability is determined by conceptual analysis based upon the law of contradiction (i.e., "rational knowledge," as in logic and mathematics), and actuality by what is known immediately (i.e., "sensory knowledge") or through the mediation of the senses (i.e., "knowledge of what is actual outside us, or knowledge of nature"). What is known immediately (and, hence, indubitably, Mendelssohn contends) is that there is an alteration among thoughts; the second thing known appears to be an inference from this, namely, that there must be something that is altered with respect to these thoughts. Hence, we can distinguish between the subject or consciousness modified by changing representations and those representations themselves in the subject's inner and outer sense (5/14, 26/39, 29/43).¹⁰ What is actual and known only in a mediated way are the objects represented by some representations. We can know the actuality of objects represented, thanks to the senses and the levels of agreement among them and, by way of causal analogies, through the degrees of agreement of successive appearances. Sometimes the resulting knowledge

⁹Mendelssohn contends that, since common sense is usually but not invariably right, reason's task is to defend speculation when it departs from common sense.

¹⁰Mendelssohn's considered view seems to be that knowledge of the enduring I is the result of an inference from the changing representations and the supposition that change requires a constant subject; see 29/43: "If my inner thoughts and sensations are actually in me, if the existence of these alterations of my self cannot be denied, then the I as well, to which these alterations pertain, must be admitted. Where there are alterations, there must also be a subject on hand that undergoes alteration. I think, therefore I am"; see, too, 30/44f; but he also seems to treat it at times as part of what is intuitively known; see 5/14.

of actual objects can be combined with “purely rational knowledge,” but when it comes to the so-called “universal laws of nature themselves” or “the doctrine of the soul and morals,” “an incomplete induction . . . must take the place of pure reason” (11/21). “Hence, every conviction which in the science of the actual and the non-actual is not purely rational knowledge is grounded on the agreement of diverse senses, under many different sorts of circumstances and modifications, and on the frequent outcome of diverse sensory appearances, placed after and next to one another” (12/22).¹¹

Mendelssohn underscores the limitations of our capacities for determining the truth, our proneness to *error* at the rational level and to *illusion* at the sensory level, though he also stresses that, while errors are corrigible, illusions cannot be corrected, since, despite being based upon incomplete inductions that result in taking a representation (*Vorstellung*) for an exhibition (*Darstellung*) of something, they are too closely related to immediate knowledge (18/29f, 26/39). This claim is excessive, to be sure, and Mendelssohn himself appears to contradict it by elaborating the source of the illusion and ways of rectifying it.¹² So, too, he recognizes the difference between a subjective and an objective combination of representations, exemplified by the difference between a dream state and a waking state, and the necessity that our impressions of the present not be too weak to prevent imaginative flights of enthusiasm or too strong to keep us from the business of meditation. Our discernment of the objective combination of representations is relative to several factors: the number of sensations of a single sort that agree with one another, the number of different sorts of sensations that concur, and the number of times our assessment agrees with those of others, of other species, and even of “higher entities” (6f/15f, 38/54f, 41/59).

Yet in the end, much like Descartes, Mendelssohn contends that the only means of certifying the actual existence of things outside us is through the demonstration of God’s existence. Hence, for Mendelssohn the demonstration of God’s existence is necessary to escape or, better, to counter the challenge of (epistemological) idealism. “If we shall have convinced ourselves of the existence of the supreme being and its properties, then a way will also present itself of making for ourselves some concept of the infinity of the supreme being’s knowledge and from this truth, along with several others, perhaps in a scientific, demonstrative manner, of refuting the pretensions of the idealists and of proving irrefutably the actual existence of a sensory world outside us” (38/55).

¹¹ In the course of making these points, Mendelssohn explicitly draws attention to his treatise on probability; see *Philosophical Writings*, 233–250/JubA 1: 147–164.

¹² “Yet, as long as we remain with sensory knowledge, as long as we regard it not as [something’s actual] exhibition [of itself] but merely as a representation, it is subject neither to doubt nor to uncertainty and has for itself a transparency of the highest degree” (26/39). “As long, however, as it restricts itself to its inner sentiments as sentiments, every semblance is a truth and I believe myself to feel just as much as I feel. Thus, the most perverted taste can neither deceive nor delude in this regard as long as we remain with the subjective sentiment” (27/41).

Part II: Scientific Doctrinal Concepts of God's Existence

On the final pages of Chap. 7, the last chapter of Part I, Mendelssohn introduces the concept of approval as a faculty irreducible to knowing or desire.¹³ Our approval of certain phenomena, for example, the satisfaction that we take in the beauty of a sunset, is distinct from our knowledge of it (the truth about it) and from any sense that it is good for us, i.e., from any desire to possess it. While the concept of approval is thus particularly important for Mendelssohn's aesthetics, he introduces it at this juncture of the *Morning Hours* in order to set the stage for the opening section of Part II where he dismisses the notion of a duty to believe what is "so connected with the happiness of the human being [i.e., God's existence] that happiness cannot exist without its truth" (50/69). In addition to denying any such duty, Mendelssohn regards it as a matter of confusing an object of approval with an object of knowledge (approval of God's existence should not be confused with knowledge of it). The model for avoiding this confusion is mathematics and Mendelssohn concludes this opening section of Part II with an attempt to approximate that model by setting forth a series of axioms "that seem naturally to follow from what we have dealt with up to this point" (52/73).

Mendelssohn next turns in earnest to the ways of establishing the existence of God. Once again, he begins by comparing theology with mathematics. In both disciplines there is a level of necessary, conceptual analysis independent of any considerations of existence. But just as applied mathematics rests upon the demonstration of some existence, so the theologian must find a way of "crossing over into the domain of actual things" (56/77). Mendelssohn recognizes three, progressively more compelling ways, beginning from (a) the testimony of outer sense, (b) the testimony of inner sense, and (c) the thought of God. The first two ways provide means of demonstrating God's existence, as long as their presuppositions – the existence of a mutable world or a mutable thinking being – are admitted. At the same time Mendelssohn recognizes all too well that metaphysicians have denied things that "sound human understanding would never dream of doubting" (57/79). Whether their motives were to embarrass dogmatists or merely to test reason's capacity to keep pace with sound human understanding, Mendelssohn acknowledges a need to come to reason's aid, particularly when it comes to establishing the basis for the first sort of proof, namely, the existence of the material world.

This acknowledgement, in addition to suggesting that reason must accord with "sound human understanding," sets the stage for perhaps the most famous passage in *Morning Hours*: the Allegorical Dream that opens Chap. 10. Mendelssohn relates how a hiking party's two guides, contemplation and common sense, part ways at a fork in the path, leaving the hiking party stranded, until reason approaches, with the advice that, if they are willing to wait, the two guides will "come back

¹³ See Mendelssohn's notes "On the ability to know, the ability to feel, and the ability to sense" (1776) in *Philosophical Writings*, 309f/JubA 3.1: 276f.

to let me [reason] resolve the dispute” (59/81). Though contemplation or speculation, as Mendelssohn also calls it, does not in fact always follow reason, he uses the allegory to indicate his basic rule, namely, to follow common sense and abandon it for speculation only if there is reason enough to do so. This rule supposedly works well against idealist, egoist (solipsistic), and skeptical doubts about the actuality of the material world. Yet as long as the demonstration of the reasonability of common sense is incomplete, those doubts diminish the evidence for a posteriori proofs of God’s existence.¹⁴ For this reason, Mendelssohn adds, “most rigorous philosophers always preferred the kind of proof that merely presupposes our own existence” (61/83f).

Mendelssohn proceeds then to argue that God must exist since God (as the sole necessary and immutable being) is the only sufficient reason for the existence of contingent, mutable beings like ourselves. But he also cautions that we thus infer God’s existence from our existence insofar as the latter is an object, not of divine thought, but of divine approval and free choice, governed by an “ethical” as opposed to “blind” necessity (71/98).

The ground for my existence must therefore be sought in a free cause that has recognized and approved me *here* and *now* as belonging to the series of the best and by this means has been moved to bring me to actuality. This free cause cannot be itself contingent since otherwise we would not have come a step closer to making the proposition comprehensible; the reason for the truth [of the proposition, ‘I myself am actually on hand’] that combines the concept of the contingent being with existence would still have to be sought anew. In the end, therefore, we have to come back to a necessary being, for whom this reason for the truth lies in the thinkability of the subject itself, to a being whose objective existence is not to be separated from its thinkability, i.e., to a being which is on hand because it can be thought (72/100).

God’s representation or knowledge of things and the best combination of them, together with his approval of them as such, is a “*vital knowledge*” on the basis of which God creates and sustains them “as limited substances outside himself” (73f/102).

As indicated by the passage quoted at length in the last paragraph, Mendelssohn ultimately endorses (as he did in the Prize Essay¹⁵) two arguments for God’s existence: an argument from our certain but contingent existence, based upon the principle of sufficient reason, and an argument from the thought of God. However, that same passage also makes clear that it is the latter argument that clinches matters in his eyes. Nonetheless, after making the former argument (Chaps. 11 and 12), Mendelssohn does not turn directly to the argument from the thought of God to God’s existence. Instead he first discusses at length (Chaps. 13–15) Spinozism and a purified or refined pantheism.

¹⁴ Similarly, in the Prize Essay Mendelssohn contends that, while probable arguments for God’s existence based upon beauty, order, and design are more eloquent and edifying, they are less certain and convincing than strict demonstrations; see *Philosophical Writings*, 291–294/JubA 2: 311–315.

¹⁵ *Philosophical Writings*, 281, 289/JubA 2: 299–300, 308–309.

The context for this discussion is the so-called *Pantheismusstreit*, Mendelssohn's dispute with Jacobi over Lessing's attitude toward Spinoza.¹⁶ Indeed, after iterating familiar arguments, his own and Wolf's, against Spinozism (e.g., its inability to explain the source of the body's motion and form or the mind's desires), Mendelssohn takes the bold step of presenting Lessing as the spokesperson for a refined version of pantheism. As this spokesperson, Lessing concedes the need to endow the sole substance not only with infinite force (as a source of motion) and goodness (as a source of desire and approval) but also with the ability to represent to itself "in the clearest and most exhaustively detailed manner all possible contingent things, along with the infinite manifolds and alterations of them, together with their diversity and goodness, beauty and order and that, by virtue of the divinity's supreme capacity to approve [the best represented by it], it has given preference to the best and most perfect series of things" (84/115). But then, Lessing asks, why presume that this series of things exists outside the divine intellect?¹⁷

Mendelssohn contends that the presumption is justified on the basis of the following considerations. Being thought by God is hardly sufficient for existence since each determinate thought excludes its opposite. What does suffice is God's approval of certain thoughts, an approval that leads to creation of the best. On the one hand, the best finite things cannot, strictly speaking, "exist" in God since they fall short of God as the "absolutely best." On the other hand, it would be inconsistent with God's efficacy if the best finite things, whose existence he approves, did not come to exist. In other words, what God approves and is, accordingly, the best is not simply the thought of the best in the divine mind but the actual existence of what corresponds to that thought.

Yet, after defending the existence of things outside God in this way, Mendelssohn raises the question of just how much, in the end, separates the theist from the refined pantheist. For if the refined pantheist acknowledges that there is a best combination of things and that a human being's happiness depends upon how much he strives to love God, then this refined version of pantheism secures religion and morality no less than theism does. The difference between them thus turns, Mendelssohn suggests, on a subtlety, namely, on the practically fruitless interpretation of the image of the divine light or source (*Quelle*), i.e., "whether God has let these thoughts of the best connection of contingent things beam forth, stream forth, flow out ... whether he has let the light of itself flash outward or only glow internally? That is to say, whether it has remained merely a source or whether the source has gushed forth into a stream?" (90/124).¹⁸

¹⁶ See Frederick Beiser, *The Fate of Reason* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1993), 92–108.

¹⁷ As Altmann points out, in these passages Mendelssohn paraphrases Lessing's study, "On the Reality of Things Outside God"; see "*Über die Wirklichkeit der Dinge ausser Gott*" in *Gotthold Ephraim Lessings sämtliche Schriften*, ed. Karl Lachmann and Franz Muncker, vol. XIV (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1968), 292–293; see Altmann, op. cit., 692f.

¹⁸ After proposing this practical rapprochement of theism and refined pantheism in Chap. 14, Mendelssohn follows in Chap. 15 with a closer discussion of Lessing's own thinking, prompted by "friend D's" objection to making Lessing the spokesperson for refined pantheism (see n. 1 above).