

Ishtiyaque Haji

Library of Ethics and Applied Philosophy 21

Freedom and Value

Freedom's Influence on
Welfare and Worldly Value



Springer

FREEDOM AND VALUE

LIBRARY OF ETHICS AND APPLIED PHILOSOPHY

VOLUME 21

Editor in Chief

Marcus Düwell, *Utrecht University, Utrecht, NL*

Editorial Board

Deryck Beyleveld, *Durham University, Durham, U.K.*

David Copp, *University of Florida, USA*

Nancy Fraser, *New School for Social Research, New York, USA*

Martin van Hees, *Groningen University, Netherlands*

Thomas Hill, *University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, USA*

Samuel Kerstein, *University of Maryland, College Park*

Will Kymlicka, *Queens University, Ontario, Canada*

Philip van Parijs, *Louvaine-la-Neuve (Belgium) en Harvard, USA*

Qui Renzong

Peter Schaber, *Ethikzentrum, University of Zürich, Switzerland*

Thomas Schmidt, *Humboldt University, Berlin, Germany*

FREEDOM AND VALUE

Freedom's Influence on Welfare and Worldly Value

by

ISHTIYAQUE HAJI

University of Calgary, AB, Canada

 Springer

Ishtiyaque Haji
University of Calgary
Dept. Philosophy
2500 University Drive NW.,
Calgary AB T2N 1N4
Canada
ihaji@ucalgary.ca

ISBN: 978-1-4020-9076-9

e-ISBN: 978-1-4020-9077-6

Library of Congress Control Number: 2008934451

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2009

No part of this work may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, microfilming, recording or otherwise, without written permission from the Publisher, with the exception of any material supplied specifically for the purpose of being entered and executed on a computer system, for exclusive use by the purchaser of the work.

Printed on acid-free paper

9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

springer.com

Acknowledgments

It is my great pleasure to acknowledge the help that I have received from others in the writing of this book.

I completed the last draft of the manuscript during my tenure of a 2008–2011 Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (SSHRC) Grant. I am most grateful to this granting agency for its support.

A number of anonymous referees, both for Springer and for certain journals, provided highly instructive criticism and helpful advice regarding sections of the manuscript. I am very thankful for this help.

Parts of the following previously published articles of mine appear either verbatim or modified in the book. With permission of Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group: Ishtiyaque Haji and Stefaan E. Cuypers, “Moral Responsibility and the Problem of Manipulation Reconsidered,” *International Journal of Philosophical Studies* 12 (2004), pp. 439–464; and Haji and Cuypers, “Magical Agents, Global Induction, and the Internalism/Externalism Debate,” *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 85 (2007), pp. 343–371; see also, these Journals’ web site: www.informaworld.com. With permission of Blackwell Synergy: “Incompatibilism’s Threat to Worldly Value: Source Incompatibilism, Desert, and Pleasure,” forthcoming in *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*. With permission of Springer: “Authentic Springs of Action and Obligation,” forthcoming in *The Journal of Ethics*. With permission of Cambridge Scholars Publishing: “Obligation and Luck,” forthcoming in *Essays on Free Will and Moral Responsibility*. Nick Trakakis, ed. With permission of the University of Arkansas Press: “Freedom, Hedonism, and the Intrinsic Value of Lives,” *Philosophical Topics* 32: 131–151. My paper, “On Frankfurt-Type Examples,” from which I have drawn first appeared in the *APA Newsletter on Philosophy and Law*, Vol. 07, No. 2, Spring 2008. I am grateful to the editors and publishers for their permission to use materials from these essays.

Many thanks to Marion Wagenaar, Editorial Assistant at Springer for her diligent work, and to Fritz Schmuhl, Publishing Editor at Springer; their valuable contributions are very much appreciated.

During the time that I have been thinking about the topics of this book, I have benefited enormously from exchanges with a number of people. I take immense pleasure in acknowledging my indebtedness to them here. They are Chris Heathwood, Michael McKenna, David McNaughton, Alfred Mele, Derk Pereboom,

and Piers Rawlings. I am especially grateful to Stefaan Cuypers who read a complete version of the manuscript.

Finally, there are two people who deserve very special mention. Michael J. Zimmerman has been a tremendous source of inspiration to me right from the beginning of my academic career. His prodigious intelligence shines through all his work. His books and papers exhibit uncompromising intellectual integrity, acute attention to detail, and amazing insight. He has stopped me from making a number of errors and suggested many, many improvements. He has given me steadfast encouragement during trying times, and has been ever ready to help. His support has been invaluable. He has been, and continues to be, my mentor and dear friend. I shall never be able to discharge the debt I owe to him.

If it had not been for Fred Feldman, I would not have gone on in philosophy. "Find a friend who can spell," he said to me sternly but with a twinkle in his eyes on returning the first paper that I drafted for him. He taught me how to write well, formulate arguments, and hone my analytic skills. He cultivated my love for philosophy. He has enriched my academic life beyond expression. Anyone who has studied Fred's numerous contributions to philosophy will recognize his genius. His works are matchless in their display of clarity, rigor, insight, and overall scintillating brilliance. If I could only think and write like Fred, I could give back a scintilla of what I owe him. Fred is very dear to me indeed.

It is to Michael and Fred that I dedicate this book with profound gratitude and respect.

Contents

1 Introduction: On Welfare and Worldly Value	1
1.1 The Focus of Inquiry: The Freedom of Axiological Judgments	1
1.2 Synopsis	5
1.2.1 Major Themes	5
1.2.2 Chapter-by-Chapter Summary	6
2 Attitudinal Hedonism	11
2.1 Simple Intrinsic Attitudinal Hedonism	11
2.2 Some Merits of Attitudinal Hedonism	15
2.2.1 A Problem Concerning Nonexistent Pleasures	15
2.2.2 A Problem Concerning False Pleasures	15
2.2.3 A Problem Concerning Base Pleasures	18
3 Freedom-Sensitive Versions of Attitudinal Hedonism	21
3.1 The Freedom of Attitudes	21
3.2 Neo's Case	23
3.3 In Support of Freedom-Sensitive Attitudinal Hedonism	25
3.4 Varieties of Freedom-Sensitive Attitudinal Hedonism	26
3.4.1 Robust Freedom-Sensitive Intrinsic Attitudinal Hedonism	26
3.4.2 Asymmetric Freedom-Sensitive Intrinsic Attitudinal Hedonism	28
3.4.3 Symmetric Freedom-Sensitive Intrinsic Attitudinal Hedonism	29
3.4.4 Pain-Adjusted Freedom-Sensitive Intrinsic Attitudinal Hedonism	31
3.5 Freedom and Well-Being	31
3.6 Objections and Replies	33
3.6.1 Welfare-Relevant Versus World-Relevant Factors	33
3.6.2 Freedom and Manipulation	36
3.6.3 Freedom and Unbidden Pleasures	36
3.6.4 Unfree Pleasures and Value	38

4	Pleasure, Desert, and Welfare	41
4.1	Pleasure and Desert	41
4.2	Why Be Drawn to Subject's Desert-Adjusted Intrinsic Attitudinal Hedonism?	44
4.2.1	Ross's Two-Worlds Objection	45
4.3	On the Value of Worlds and Lives	46
4.4	The Freedom of Our Decisions	49
4.5	Authentic Springs of Action and Value	52
4.6	Freedom, Desert, and Value	54
4.7	Freedom and the Value of Action-Based Pleasures	57
5	Authentic Springs of Action	61
5.1	Authenticity and Welfare	61
5.2	A Comparison with Noggle's Account	67
5.3	Some Objections and Responses	69
5.4	Authenticity and Well-Being: an Objection	72
5.5	Authenticity and Well-Being: Another Objection	73
6	Incompatibilism, Compatibilism, Desert, and Value	77
6.1	Subject's Desert-Adjusted Intrinsic Attitudinal Hedonism, Lives, and Worlds	77
6.2	Some Source Incompatibilist Presuppositions	77
6.3	Some Principles	79
6.4	The Argument from Control	80
6.5	The Argument from Desert	81
6.6	The Argument from Authenticity	87
6.7	Compatibilism, Well-Being, and the Value of Worlds	88
6.8	Libertarianism, Well-Being, and the Value of Worlds	89
7	Freedom, Obligation, and the Good	91
7.1	Obligation, Freedom, and the Value of Worlds	91
7.2	Determinism, Alternative Possibilities, and Obligation	92
7.3	Ross's Objection Revisited	94
7.4	A Remaining Problem Concerning Freedom with <i>Subject's Desert-Adjusted Intrinsic Attitudinal Hedonism</i>	94
7.5	Varieties of Freedom-Sensitive World-Ranking Axiologies	97
7.6	On the Value of Worlds and Moral Obligation	99
7.7	The Value of Worlds and the Repugnant Conclusion	101
7.7.1	An Objection to Totalism: the Repugnant Conclusion	102
7.7.2	A Response to Parfit's Concerns Regarding Totalism	102
7.8	Inauthenticity and Obligation	105
7.8.1	Freedom's Bearing on the Value of Worlds	106
7.8.2	Inauthenticity and the Undoing of Moral Obligation	106
7.9	Conclusion	108

- 8 Hard Incompatibilism’s Axiological Costs** 111
 - 8.1 The Issues 111
 - 8.2 Hard Incompatibilism 111
 - 8.3 First Cost: Hard Incompatibilism, Worldly Value, and the Repugnant Conclusion 113
 - 8.4 Second Cost: Hard Incompatibilism and Moral Obligation 115
 - 8.5 Compatibilism, Worldly Value, and the Repugnant Conclusion 116
 - 8.6 Conclusion 117

- 9 Hard Incompatibilism, Practical Reason, and the Good** 119
 - 9.1 Introduction 119
 - 9.2 Practical Reason and Alternative Possibilities 119
 - 9.3 Practical Reason and Value 124
 - 9.4 Practical Reason and Worldly Value 129
 - 9.5 Practical Reason and Compatibilism 133

- 10 Value, Obligation, and Luck** 135
 - 10.1 The Issues: The Value of Worlds and Luck 135
 - 10.2 The Libertarian Freedom Presupposition of Obligation 135
 - 10.3 Event-Causal Libertarianism 136
 - 10.4 Event-Causal Libertarianism and the Luck Objection 137
 - 10.5 Obligation, Luck, and the Simple Theory 144
 - 10.6 Unfreedom and Luck 144
 - 10.7 Obligation, Luck, and *Subject’s Desert-Adjusted Intrinsic Attitudinal Hedonism* 145
 - 10.8 Well-Being and Luck 146

- 11 Freedom Presuppositions of Preferentism** 149
 - 11.1 An Alternative Axiology: Preferentism 149
 - 11.2 Simple Preferentism 150
 - 11.3 Subjective Preferentism 152
 - 11.4 Truth-Sensitive Preferentism 154
 - 11.5 Objections to an Authenticity Constraint and Replies 157
 - 11.6 Source Incompatibilism and Well-Being 166

- 12 Freedom and Whole-Life Satisfaction Theories of Welfare** 169
 - 12.1 Introduction 169
 - 12.2 An Outline of Sumner’s Theory 169
 - 12.3 Some Comments on Sumner’s Theory 175
 - 12.4 Hard Incompatibilism, Authenticity, and Whole-Life Satisfactionism 179
 - 12.5 Overall Conclusion 180

Appendix A: On Determinism, Randomness, and Desert 185

 A.1 Luck and Desert Principles 185

 A.1.1 Latham Adds 186

 A.2 Evaluation of Latham’s Position 187

Appendix B: On the Creation of Worlds and Worldly Value 191

References 195

Index 201

Chapter 1

Introduction: On Welfare and Worldly Value

1.1 The Focus of Inquiry: The Freedom of Axiological Judgments

Hypological, *deontic*, and *axiological* judgments are among the many different sorts of moral judgment, each sort expressing a moral appraisal of some variety. Hypological judgments are judgments concerned with moral responsibility.¹ It is widely accepted that freedom is relevant to the truth of such judgments. We believe that a person cannot be morally blameworthy or praiseworthy for an action unless she exercises “freedom-relevant control” in its performance; in more mundane parlance, she cannot be responsible unless she acts with “free will.” It has been less commonly acknowledged that freedom also bears on the truth of morally deontic judgments that have to do with moral right, wrong, and obligation. For instance, it has been argued that if an action is morally obligatory for an agent, then she could have refrained from performing it (Zimmerman 1997, Haji 2002). Relatively little thought, however, has been invested into whether the truth of *axiological judgments*—judgments regarding good or evil—presupposes freedom. I suspect that this important matter has not garnered the attention that it deserves owing to what is perhaps a prevalent assumption that freedom leaves axiological appraisals, by and large, unaffected. The central aim of this book is to dispute this assumption by arguing for the relevance of freedom to axiology.

Many distinctions within the category of axiological judgments can be made. Within the broad class of such judgments, the ones of interest in this work are, first, axiological judgments that are judgments of intrinsic value. Roughly, something is intrinsically good if it is good “in itself”; it is good “for its own sake” (the notion of being intrinsically bad is to be similarly understood). This sort of value is often contrasted with instrumental value, which is one type of extrinsic value: loosely, something is instrumentally good if it is good as a means; it contributes either directly or indirectly to the existence of something that is intrinsically good.²

¹ Michael Zimmerman (2006, p. 585, n. 1) explains that the term “hypological” is drawn from the Greek *ὑπολογος*, meaning “held accountable or liable.”

² The term “instrumental value” can also be used to refer to a type of intrinsic value. See Ronnow-Rasmussen (2002b). I make no such use of it in this work.

Second, the judgments commanding interest may be regarded as a subset of the class of judgments of intrinsic value. These are axiological judgments that pertain both to personal well-being (or, alternatively, individual welfare) and to the intrinsic value of worlds. Regarding the former, philosophers have long inquired into what makes a life good in itself for the one who lives it. What makes a life high in individual welfare? Many different answers have been given to this question. Hedonism, for example, is one of them. The hedonist appeals to the view that pleasure is the *good* to account for the amount of welfare that an individual enjoys. In the hedonist's estimation, the *good life* is the pleasant life. In contrast, preferentists maintain that what makes a life intrinsically good for a person is that desires of some sort are satisfied rather than frustrated within that life. Regarding the assessment of worlds, the concern is not with individual well-being but, rather, with the intrinsic value of *entire* worlds: when is one possible world intrinsically better than another?

If we suspect that freedom in some manner or other affects the intrinsic value of lives or worlds, how precisely are we to establish that this is so? To make headway, I harness the following two strategies. First, I agree with a number of theorists that every axiology—roughly, every theory of intrinsic value—specifies some items that have their intrinsic values in the most primary way (see, for instance, Harman 1967, Chisholm 1986, Feldman 2000, Zimmerman 2001). The *basic intrinsic value states* of each axiology are the items that the axiology takes to be the most fundamental bearers of intrinsic value (Feldman 2004, p. 173). Each of these items has its intrinsic value in a nonderivative way. Think of each such item as an “atom” of value. The intrinsic value of a complex thing, such as a life, a world, or the total consequence of an action, is the sum of the value of its atoms. To appreciate what these atoms may be on hedonistic axiologies, drawing a distinction between attitudinal pleasures and displeasures, on the one hand, and sensory pleasures and pains, on the other, is helpful. A person experiences sensory pleasures at a time when she feels pleasurable sensations. Attitudinal pleasures are not feelings or sensory pleasures; they need not have any “feel.” Such pleasures are always directed onto objects; they are propositional attitudes. A person takes attitudinal pleasure in some state of affairs “if he enjoys it, is pleased about it, is glad that it is happening, is delighted by it” (Feldman 2004, p. 56).³ To take intrinsic pleasure in a fact is to take pleasure in it for its own sake (corresponding things are true about displeasures). One sort of hedonist—the sensory hedonist—proposes that the atoms of value that contribute to welfare value are episodes of sensory pleasure and sensory pain; a different sort—the attitudinal hedonist—takes these atoms to be episodes of intrinsic attitudinal pleasures and intrinsic displeasures. A preferentist, in contrast, may

³ For more on the distinction between sensory and nonsensory pleasures, see, for example, Brentano (1969, pp. 154–155); Chisholm (1986, p. 26); and Lemos (1994, pp. 67–73). Zimmerman (2001, pp. 195–198) proposes that attitudinal pleasures and displeasures do have an affective aspect, so an adequate account of the nature of attitudinal pleasure and displeasure must make reference to their affective aspect; and that an adequate account of the value of these attitudes must also make reference to this aspect.

take episodes of desire satisfactions and desire frustrations of one's actual desires to be the atoms. On the first strategy to uncover the freedom presuppositions of life- or world-ranking axiological judgments, we inquire into whether free "positive" atoms—free intrinsic attitudinal pleasures, for example—are intrinsically better than (or maybe not as good as) otherwise similar atoms that are unfree, and whether free "negative" atoms—free intrinsic displeasures, for instance—are not as bad as (or perhaps worse than) otherwise similar unfree atoms, the freedom at issue being the freedom that moral responsibility demands. Are there indeed reasons to believe that free intrinsic attitudinal pleasures, for instance, are more valuable than otherwise similar unfree pleasures? And if they are more valuable, are they more valuable for the world or for the well-being of the subject who receives them or for both?

I believe that this first strategy can be effectively implemented only in connection with substantive views about the *good life* or about the intrinsic value of worlds. For the most part, the substantive theories to which discussion in this work is confined are various forms of attitudinal hedonism. I shall, though, also address some varieties of preferentism and a prominent version of a "whole-life satisfaction" account of welfare that explains personal well-being by appealing to a certain "whole-life" view of happiness (Sumner 1996). In this way, the inquiry into the freedom presuppositions of the pertinent axiological judgments will be restricted but rendered more manageable at the same time.

Second, having made the *prima facie* case that free positive atoms (on some of the substantive views at issue) are better either for lives or worlds than otherwise similar atoms that are not free and that free negative atoms are not as bad, again either for lives or worlds, as otherwise similar unfree atoms, we may look more closely at the very constituents of the atoms. We may ask whether these constituents themselves have freedom presuppositions. As an illustration, many have supposed that deserved intrinsic pleasures are better than corresponding pleasures that are not deserved and that deserved intrinsic displeasures are not as bad as otherwise similar displeasures that are not deserved. Suppose that on some credible version of attitudinal hedonism, desert of intrinsic pleasure (or of intrinsic displeasure) is an element of an atom—a "world atom"—that pertains to the intrinsic value of worlds. An action-based pleasure (or displeasure) is a pleasure that, if deserved, is deserved on the basis of performing some action. If it can be argued that such a pleasure (or displeasure) is deserved only if it is free, and if it can further be secured that a pleasure is free only if it causally derives from a decision that is free, then we can show that freedom has an indirect impact on the intrinsic value of worlds by way of having an impact on desert and mental action.

A predominant part of my interest in uncovering the freedom presuppositions of various axiological judgments resides in the following. Determinism is the thesis that there is at any instant exactly one physically possible future (van Inwagen 1983, p. 3). On this picture, the future is not a "garden of forking paths" but is a branchless extension of the past. One of the central questions in the free-will debate is whether the freedom that moral responsibility requires is compatible with determinism. What this freedom amounts to is, of course, something that is hotly debated.

Some theorists have argued that a person has the right sort of freedom or control only if she had genuine alternatives; she “could have done otherwise” (see e.g., van Inwagen 1983, Ginet 1996). Others have suggested that a person has the required control only if she is appropriately sensitive to reasons; she would, under specified conditions, have performed some other action were apt reasons present (see, e.g., Fischer and Ravizza 1998, Haji 1998); still others have maintained that a person has the pertinent control just in case she identifies with the action’s motivating desires (Frankfurt 1971); and yet others have defended the view that the germane control consists in the action being produced nondeviantly by causal antecedents such as desires, beliefs, values, and so forth that satisfy certain constraints (Mele 1995). If determinism is true (i.e., if it is true that all events are deterministically caused or, as I shall say, are “causally determined”), the “genuine” (nonrelational) facts of the past, together with the laws of nature, entail all truths. Compatibilists have argued that determinism poses no threat to judgments of moral praiseworthiness or moral blameworthiness. More generally, they defend the view that free action and moral responsibility are compatible with determinism. Incompatibilism is the denial of compatibilism. Incompatibilists, for one or more reasons, have championed the view that determinism undermines the truth of hypological judgments. Some incompatibilists have attempted to show that determinism rules out alternative possibilities. They have gone on to claim that freedom to do otherwise is necessary for responsibility, and thus have arrived at the conclusion that determinism and responsibility are not friendly partners. Other incompatibilists have proposed that if our actions originate in sources over which we have no control, then we are not the ultimate originators of these actions. Such “source incompatibilists” have suggested that “ultimate origination” is a requirement of free action and responsibility, and thus have, via this route, concluded once again that determinism and responsibility are incompatible. Libertarians are incompatibilists who believe that at least some of us, at times, perform free actions for which we are morally responsible; their view implies that if we are morally responsible, then determinism is false.

Assume, for the sake of explaining a pivotal incentive to inquire into the freedom presuppositions of axiological appraisals having to do with welfare and worlds, that incompatibilists in the free-will battle have won the day. If determinism undermines the freedom that moral responsibility requires and if it is also true that free atoms (on the substantive axiologies in question) are more intrinsically valuable than otherwise similar unfree atoms, then determinism has a nontrivial effect on intrinsic value. Further, suppose it can be shown that the freedom of the atoms on a given axiology traces to, or is derivative from, the freedom of various actions, such as (the making of) decisions. Then this opens up another venue for the incompatibilist to marshal support for the view that determinism is more menacing than it has hitherto been appreciated to be: it has a definite impact on various, significant axiological appraisals. So just as one may wonder whether determinism is compatible with the truth of hypological judgments, so, too, one may wonder whether determinism is compatible with the truth of various axiological judgments.