Introduction

Although anticipations can be found in the works of HENRI BERGSON, FRANZ BRENTANO, WILHELM DILTHEY, WILLIAM JAMES, and others, the phenomenological movement began in the reflections of EDMUND HUSSERL during the mid-1890s and is thus over a century old. It spread from GERMANY to JAPAN, RUSSIA, and SPAIN and also from philosophy to PSYCHIATRY before World War I; to AUSTRALIA, FRANCE, HUNGARY, THE NETHERLANDS AND FLANDERS, POLAND, and the UNITED STATES and to EDUCATION, MUSIC, and RELIGION during the 1920s; and to CZECHOSLOVAKIA, ITALY, KOREA, and YUGOSLAVIA and to ARCHITECTURE, LITERATURE, and THEATER during the 1930s. Phenomenology then spread to PORTUGAL, SCANDINAVIA, and SOUTH AFRICA, and also to ETHNIC STUDIES, FEMINISM, FILM, and POLITICAL THEORY right after World War II; then to CANADA, CHINA, and INDIA and to DANCE, GEOGRAPHY, LAW, and PSYCHOLOGY in the 1960s and 1970s; and finally to GREAT BRITAIN and also to ECOLOGY, ETHNOLOGY, and NURSING in the 1980s and 1990s. Given its spread into other disciplines as well as across the planet, phenomenology is arguably the major philosophical movement of the 20th Century.

WHAT IS PHENOMENOLOGY?

What are the typical characteristics of phenomenology? How does it relate with other philosophical movements? What are its tendencies and stages? Negatively speaking, phenomenologists tend to oppose the acceptance of unobservable matters and grand systems erected in speculative thinking. Furthermore, they tend to oppose NATURALISM, the worldview generalized from modern NATURAL SCIENCE and TECHNOLOGY that has been spreading from Northern Europe since the Renaissance. However, opposing naturalism is not the same as opposing natural science, as the phenomenological tradition within the philosophy of natural science shows.

Unfortunately, opponents of naturalism (including opponents of behaviorism and positivism in psychology, social science, and philosophy) are often astonishingly eclectic and sometimes consider any form of non-naturalistic thought "phenomenology." This goes too far. Alternatively, some consider only Husserl's transcendental first philosophy to be phenomenology. Given, however, the non-transcendental tendencies within philosophical phenomenology as well as the great deal of non-philosophical phenomenology, this does not go far enough. The present encyclopedia urges a way between these extremes.

There are five positive features accepted by most phenomenologists, regardless of discipline, tendency, or period:

(1) phenomenologists tend to justify cognition (and some also evaluation and action) with reference to EVIDENCE, which is awareness of a matter itself as disclosed in the most clear, distinct, and adequate way possible for something of its kind;

(2) phenomenologists tend to believe that not only objects in the natural and cultural worlds, but also ideal objects, such as numbers, and even conscious life itself can be made evident and thus known about;

(3) phenomenologists tend to hold that inquiry ought to focus upon what might be called

Lester Embree, Elizabeth A. Behnke, David Carr, J. Claude Evans, José Huertas-Jourda, Joseph J. Kockelmans, William R. McKenna, Algis Mickunas, Jitendra Nath Mohanty, Thomas M. Seebohm, Richard M. Zaner (eds.), Encyclopedia of Phenomenology.

"encountering" as it is directed at objects and, correlatively, upon "objects as they are encountered" (this terminology is not widely shared, but the emphasis on a dual problematics and the reflective approach it requires are);

(4) phenomenologists tend to recognize the role of description in universal, a priori, or "eidetic" terms as prior to explanation by means of causes, purposes, or grounds; and

(5) phenomenologists tend to debate whether or not what Husserl calls the transcendental phenomenological EPOCHĒ AND REDUCTION is useful or even possible.

EVOLUTION OF THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL AGENDA

Four successively dominant and sometimes overlapping tendencies and stages can be recognized within this century-old, international, and multidisciplinary movement. These can be characterized as (a) REALISTIC, (b) CONSTITUTIVE, (c) EXISTENTIAL, and (d) HERMENEUTICAL PHENOMENOLOGY. Any attempt to summarize the wealth of views that fall under these headings would certainly be inadequate, but an attempt to chronicle the changing set of issues addressed in the movement, which can be called the *phenomenological agenda*, may be helpful. Words in ALL CAPITAL LETTERS name entries in which issues are discussed.

There were later attempts to expand and rearrange the phenomenological agenda, but it was Husserl himself who originally drafted it. His *Logische Untersuchungen* (Logical Investigations, 1900–1901) is most famous for its attack on PSYCHOLOGISM, which is the attempt to absorb logic into empirical psychology. The philosophies of LOGIC and also MATHEMATICS, which Husserl considered continuous with logic, are then the first items on the agenda. LANGUAGE has also been an item from the outset, along with PERCEPTION and various types of RE-PRESENTATION (e.g., EXPECTATION, IMAGINATION, and MEMORY). Finally, where the question of methodology is concerned, i.e., how he got his results, Husserl began to reflect from the outset upon what came to be called EIDETIC METHOD.

Because of its reflective, evidential, and eidetically descriptive approach to both encounterings and objects as encountered, as well as because of the issues on the agenda that are thus approached, this inauguration is often called, somewhat redundantly, "descriptive phenomenology." The four main tendencies within the ensuing movement are directly or indirectly branches sprouting from this stem.

(1) REALISTIC PHENOMENOLOGY emerged in a group of young philosophers at the University of Munich led by JOHANNES DAUBERT just after the turn of the century and was then extended principally by ADOLF REINACH to include students at Göttingen, where Husserl then taught. This tendency emphasizes eidetic method in the search for universal essences. ALEXANDER PFÄNDER, HERBERT SPIEGELBERG, and KARL SCHUHMANN and BARRY SMITH have led successive generations of realistic phenomenology.

In "Die apriorischen Grundlagen des bürgerlichen Rechts" (The apriori foundations of civil law, 1911), Reinach added the philosophy of law to the phenomenological agenda. Furthermore, in *Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik* (Formalism in ethics and nonformal

ethics of values, 1913/1916), MAX SCHELER added not only ETHICS but also VALUE THEORY to the agenda, and in later works he added philosophy of RELIGION and PHILOSOPHICAL ANTHROPOLOGY. Moreover, EDITH STEIN added the philosophy of the HUMAN SCIENCES. Finally, MORITZ GEIGER and ROMAN INGARDEN added AESTHETICS, ARCHITECTURE, MUSIC, and LITERATURE during the 1920s and 1930s; the phenomenology of FILM was initiated by Ingarden in the 1940s.

(2) CONSTITUTIVE PHENOMENOLOGY's founding text is Husserl's *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie I* (Ideas pertaining to a pure phenomenology and phenomenological philosophy, 1913). The earlier epistemological focus on logic and mathematics came to include the philosophy of NATURAL SCIENCE or at least physics, which later predominates in Husserl's last work, *Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale Phänomenologie* (The crisis of the European sciences and transcendental phenomenology, 1936). Subsequent generations in constitutive phenomenology of the natural sciences include OSKAR BECKER, ARON GURWITSCH, and ELISABETH STRÖKER.

Ideen I is, however, largely devoted to demonstrations of and reflections upon phenomenological method. Most constitutive phenomenology relies on transcendental phenomenological EPOCHĒ AND REDUCTION. This procedure involves suspending acceptance of the pregiven status of conscious life as in the world and is performed in order to secure an ultimate intersubjective grounding for the world and the positive sciences concerned with it.

Use of this method places constitutive phenomenology in the transcendental tradition that goes back at least to KANT within MODERN PHILOSOPHY, although Husserl related himself primarily to BRITISH EMPIRICISM. He differs from his transcendentalist predecessors in holding that conscious life in its transcendental status does not need to be deduced as the condition for the possibility of the WORLD because the way in which objects of all sorts are constituted in conscious life can be reflectively observed and described after the transcendental epochē has been performed. The other tendencies within phenomenology have not accepted this procedure.

Husserl had reacted to Dilthey and others in his manifesto "Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft" (1911) and had thereby begun to reflect on HISTORY. The concrete demonstration of constitutive phenomenology, as a tracing of experienced matters, formations, etc., back to the subjective processes, achievements, etc., in which they are encountered, was presented in his *Ideen II* [1912–15], a text that was not, however, published until 1952, but was known in manuscript form to EDITH STEIN, MARTIN HEIDEGGER, LUDWIG LANDGREBE, and MAURICE MERLEAU-PONTY (but not ALFRED SCHUTZ, who nonetheless independently developed a convergent CONSTITUTIVE PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE NATURAL ATTITUDE focused on social life). Nevertheless, this esoterically known text also added the BODY to the agenda and showed clearly that the world is originally cultural.

In *Formale und transzendentale Logik* (Formal and transcendental logic, 1929) and the posthumous *Erfahrung und Urteil* (Experience and judgement, 1939), Husserl returned to logic and mathematics and thereby the task of the formal unification of all knowledge from the standpoint of transcendental constitutive phenomenology. GASTON BERGER, JEAN CAVAILLÈS, ARON GURWITSCH, EUGEN FINK, and LUDWIG LANDGREBE in the second generation and then J. N. MOHANTY,

THOMAS M. SEEBOHM, ROBERT SOKOLOWSKI, and ELISABETH STRÖKER in the third generation have been leading but not uncritical advocates of constitutive phenomenology after Husserl.

(3) EXISTENTIAL PHENOMENOLOGY. The second most influential phenomenologist is MARTIN HEIDEGGER, Husserl's chosen successor at Freiburg, who published *Sein und Zeit* in 1927. This incomplete masterpiece attempted to go beyond the regional ontologies sketched by Husserl to establish FUNDAMENTAL ONTOLOGY and to place it at the top of the phenomenological agenda. Heidegger's work was, however, initially appreciated solely for its account of human existence or DASEIN and thus not as the intended means to uncovering the meaning of Being (*Sein*). Existential phenomenology was thus inaugurated by a misinterpretation.

HANNAH ARENDT seems to have been the first existential phenomenologist. This is evident in her dissertation, *Die Liebesbegriffe bei Augustin* (The concept of love in Augustine, 1929). Moreover, her essay "What is Existenz Philosophy?" (1946) reflects her acceptance during the 1920s of methods from Husserl — not, however, for philosophy of science, but rather for the problems of human existence already raised in Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, and KARL JASPERS as well as in Heidegger.

With the rise to power in 1933 of National Socialism — which Heidegger supported — German phenomenology was disrupted and the period of chiefly existential phenomenology began in FRANCE. GABRIEL MARCEL independently focused on the problem of the BODY and made it prominent on the existential agenda, but the main figures in FRANCE are SIMONE DE BEAUVOIR, MAURICE MERLEAU-PONTY, and JEAN-PAUL SARTRE. Also influenced by Alexandre Kojève (1902–1968) and Jean Wahl (1888–1974), they expanded reflection on problems of human existence to include issues raised in HEGEL and the recently discovered early MARX. Perhaps EMMANUEL LEVINAS also belongs to this tendency and, while the problem of INTERSUBJECTIVITY had also been addressed in Scheler, Husserl, and Schutz, it became central to the agenda for him.

Human freedom was made prominent in *L'être et le néant* (Being and nothingness, 1943) by Sartre, who had earlier published books on the phenomenology of EMOTION and also IMAGINATION. He furthermore moved THEATER and LITERATURE higher on the agenda. Other existential issues include ACTION, desire, conflict, the fragility of REASON, historical contingencies, human finitude, oppression, and death. The inclusion of GESTALT PSYCHOLOGY into phenomenology, which had been begun by Gurwitsch, was continued in Merleau-Ponty's *Phénoménologie de la perception* (Phenomenology of perception, 1945). Merleau-Ponty seems also to have made POLITICS an unignorable item with his *Humanisme et terreur* (1948). Although Arendt is more famous for her political theory, the problem of ETHNICITY, which first appeared in her articles such as "Race-Thinking before Racism" (1944) and then in *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (1951), would seem to be her most original contribution to the agenda. Ethnicity was also addressed in existential perspective by Beauvoir, by Levinas, and by Sartre in *Réflexions sur le question juive* (Reflections on the Jewish question, 1946), and also in constitutive perspective by Schutz in "Equality and the Meaning Structure of the Social World" (1955). Beauvoir independently and quite influentially placed FEMINISM on the agenda in *La deuxième sexe* (1949), asserting one is not born but becomes a woman, although Edith Stein's posthumous *Die Frau* [1930] shows

that Beauvoir was not the first phenomenologist interested in gender. Beauvoir's reflections on old age appear, however, unprecedented.

Existential phenomenology has been continued by such figures as JOHN COMPTON, MICHEL HENRY, MAURICE NATANSON, and BERNHARD WALDENFELS. It is not inconceivable that interest in it could be revived through study of Arendt and Beauvoir. And it is also not irrelevant that the phenomenological tendencies in non-philosophical disciplines have tended to find great affinity with existential phenomenology.

(4) Just as realistic and then constitutive phenomenology chiefly stem from Husserl, not only existential but also the fourth tendency, HERMENEUTICAL PHENOMENOLOGY, chiefly stem from Heidegger. According to *Sein und Zeit*, all of human existence is interpretive and hence there is no access to anything except through understanding of the matters themselves as they appear within context. The beginning of this fourth tendency can be traced back to HANS-GEORG GADAMER'S phenomenological interpretations of Greek texts, particularly *Platons dialektische Ethik* (Plato's dialectical ethics, 1931). The tendency reemerged after the Nazi period and World War II with the publication of his *Wahrheit und Methode* (Truth and method, 1960), which has had a considerable impact. Other leaders of this tendency are PAUL RICŒUR in France (*Le conflit des interpretations* [The conflict of interpretations, 1969]), PATRICK HEELAN, DON IHDE, GRAEME NICHOLSON, JOSEPH J. KOCKELMANS, and CALVIN O. SCHRAG in North America, GIANNI VATTIMO and CARLO SINI in ITALY, etc.

In contrast to existential phenomenology, hermeneutical phenomenology fully appreciates Heidegger's central concern with Being. TECHNOLOGY, which was introduced as an issue for phenomenology in *Sein und Zeit*, can also be said to be first widely accepted on the hermeneutical version of the phenomenological agenda. Otherwise, the issues of hermeneutical phenomenology include the established concerns of aesthetics, ethics, history, language, law, literature, perception, politics, religion, the philosophy of the natural and especially the human sciences, etc. What is different is how it approaches them, i.e., the method of HERMENEUTICS. Hermeneutical phenomenology has also led to much scholarship on eminent texts of major figures in the history of philosophy and there has been extensive influence within the human sciences.

The periods and geographical centers of the history of the phenomenological movement correspond to when and where each of the four tendencies have received the predominance of attention. Realistic and constitutive phenomenology continue, but their original and strongest periods were in Germany before and after World War I. The existential period extended from the 1930s to the 1960s and was centered in France. Most of the attention during the hermeneutical period of the 1960s through 1980s was in the United States, where phenomenologists numbered not in the scores, but in the hundreds.

With the collapse of the UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS, greater contact with the remarkably enduring Eastern European traditions of phenomenology, the growing interest in phenomenology in Latin America and Asia and indeed most nations, and finally, the increase in international travel and communication, it seems plausible at the time of writing to suppose that the period of American phenomenology is waning and that a fifth and *planetary period* is beginning. If so, how the agenda might be reordered or otherwise altered during the phenomenological move-